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THE STATE OF THE CANON IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LESSONS FROM THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL
David E. Marion*
Constitutional law has been an active battlefield as competing groups within
the academy seek to deconstruct, reconstruct, and/or relegitimize the teaching and
practice of law in the United States. Much of the rhetoric of the debate is couched
in the language of rights. There is a danger that diminished attention to powers in
the rhetoric and teaching of constitutional law may compromise sober and
moderate constitutional reasoning. By reinvigorating reflection onpowers-related
issues, the legal profession can do its part to promote sobriety, and hence an added
dose of prudence, in constitutional reflection and discourse by a democratic
citizenry whose natural impulse is to make self-serving demands in the name of
individual freedom and autonomy. In the constitutional reasoning and
jurisprudence of John Marshall can be found considerable support for striking a
balance between attention to powers and rights.
INTRODUCTION
A veritable bull market in constitutional theory, or constitutional theorizing, has
been raging for several decades. This has occurred at the same time as our popular
culture has become increasingly "legalized." It would be naive to think that the
conjunction of heightened academic and journalistic/media interest in constitutional
history and legal theory is merely a coincidence. A better explanation is available.
The modern perception of the judiciary as a vehicle for regime-transformation is a
major reason why philosophy professors and literary criticism scholars have joined
more traditional students of the law in debating the means and ends of constitutional
decision-making. For some scholars and practitioners, victory means reconstructing
a legal system that is seen as oppressive and alienating; witness the arguments
associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement.' Not all the major players in
this on-going debate, however, are advocates of radical reform. Some participants
propose new ways (e.g., application of efficiency theory) of legitimizing something
* Director of the Center for Leadership in the Public Interest and Elliott Professor of
Political Science at Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia. The author gratefully
acknowledges the financial support of the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of Virginia
that facilitated research on this article.
A useful review of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) "project" appears in Mark
Tushnet, Critical LegalStudies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1526(1991). CLS
assumes the inseparability of law and politics. Id. at 1517.
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close to the status quo. The "no holds barred" match that has engaged so many
scholars is of considerable significance to the rest of us. If the "combatants" are
right about the stakes of this exercise, the victor will enjoy considerable influence
over the evolution, including the objectives and operations, of the republic that
James Madison "fathered" and that John Marshall so carefully nurtured.
The extent to which the rhetoric of "reconstructors" and "relegitimizers" is
infused with references to individual rights or freedoms and personal autonomy is
especially striking. It was approximately a quarter century ago when Ronald
Dworkin declared that"the language of rights now dominates political debate in the
United States."2 The Civil Rights Movement, Warren Court decisions in First and
Fourteenth Amendment cases, and the publication of books such as John Rawls'
Theory of Justice all contributed to the situation described by Dworkin.'
Significantly, the largely rights-sensitive match going on within the academy,
represented in what is being taught and published, has its counterpart outside
academic institutions in both subtle and high-profile attempts by academicians to
influence judicial decision-making--consider the "philosophers' brief' in
Washington v. Glucksberg4 (the physician-assisted suicide case) and the
anti-impeachment petition circulated by law professors in an effort to influence
legislative voting during the Clinton hearings.' Considering the influence the legal
profession historically has enjoyed in the United States, the character and
implications of the debate centered on the teaching of constitutional law warrant
special attention by persons interested in the cultural evolution of America.
The makeup of the "canon," along with any agenda brought to bear on the way
it is taught and applied, inevitably affects conversations and thought about matters
that shape our way of life." In the case of constitutional law, the canon shapes the
teaching of students who are drawn in disproportionate numbers into leadership
positions, including government positions. It is precisely considerations such as
these that lead some reform-minded scholars to justify an anti-foundational, rather
than a canonical, approach to the teaching of constitutional law. For all of these
2 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977).
' See id. There is no reason to believe that circumstances have changed since Dworkin
made his claim in 1977. In this connection, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK x
(1991) (declaring that "discourse about rights has become the principal language that we use
in public settings to discuss weighty questions of right and wrong").
4 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Professors andPolitics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 191, 193-94 (1999).
6 An account of the "constraints" associated with literary and legal canons can be found
in Stanley Fish, Not of an Age, But for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism, 43 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 11, 12, 16 (1993). An attempt to employ a literary approach to the law without
reducing the legal "canon" to the status of a completely "subjective" entity can be found in
JAMES BOYD WHiTE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OFTHE LAW
95-104 (1985) [hereinafter HERACLES' Bow].
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reasons, the manner in which constitutional law is taught, as well as what is taught,
has important implications for all Americans-it would be irresponsible not to
approach this subject as one of fundamental "political" importance.
I. RECONSTRUCTIONISM IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT
Reflecting recent developments in literary criticism and in American culture
and politics since the 1960s, a number of legal scholars have been openly
considering whether it makes sense to speak of a constitutional law canon, a set of
defining or formative cases that should shape the study and discussion of
constitutional law, and whether the language in which legal conversations occur
needs to be revised to accommodate the alleged changes in our collective
understanding of what makes for a just and decent society. Much of the reform
rhetoric is couched in the language of rights and equality. Driving the most
significant challenge to the traditional structure of legal study and discourse is the
conviction that an important disjunction exists between the aims of post-New Deal
America and the legal culture that shapes the teaching and practice of law in the
United States. Bruce Ackerman of Yale Law School called on the legal profession
in the mid-1980s to "construct a new language of power that does justice to the
aspirations for justice of our fellow citizens."7 Appeals for paradigm reforms that
accentuate personal liberty and/or principles of individual dignity, equal protection,
and efficiency have been characteristic of legal scholarship during the last third of
the twentieth century.' Although not an American scholar, Jirgen Habermas has
influenced scholarly work in the United States with his call for an epistemic
democracy based on discourse theory.9 The conditions for such a democracy
" BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 4 (1984) [hereinafter
RECONSTRUCTING]. For an example of the historicist claim that canons are socially
constructed see Fish, supra note 6, at 20. Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas Law
School captured Ackerman's present stature among legal scholars with the declaration that
he is "America's greatest theorist of transition." Sanford Levinson, Transitions, 108 YALE
L.J. 2215, 2215 (1999). Ackerman presented himself as a trailblazer in a 1999 essay and as
a scholar whose arguments were taken seriously by the Clinton White House. See Bruce A.
Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2344 n. 127 (1999)
[hereinafter Revolution].
8 See, e.g., FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL
REFORM; ACKERMAN, supra note 7; see also REFORMING THE LAW (Gary B. Melton ed.)
(1987); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignity Theory, 61
B.U.L. REv. 885 (1981) (appeal by Jerry Mashaw of Yale Law School for the construction
of a "dignity theory" of due process). Reconstructive theories in the legal field reflect atrend
in social thought generally. See, e.g., ROERTO MONGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS
SITUATION AND ITS TASK (1987).
9 See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON
DISCOURSE ETHICS 1 (Studies in Contemporary German Thought) (Ciaran Cronin trans.,
2001]
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include using constitutional law to secure for the people "[e]qual opportunities for
the political use of communicative freedoms.""
Bruce Ackerman's labors on behalf of a new democratic order that is capable
of mastering "structures of exploitation" are among the most well-known reform
efforts of the last quarter century." Believing that the United States is "far. from
being a well-ordered liberal state," Ackerman calls for reforms that will permit a
person to "live his own life regardless of what his neighbors maythink of him."' 2
His announced goal is to assist the country in making good on the promise of a more
humane society commonly associated with theNew Deal and the Civil Rights era."
In this connection, he sees lawyers as having a special responsibility to move this
project along by adopting his model of a polity whose character is defined by an
ongoing "[I]iberal conversation" that occurs within a "structure of undominated
equality.""' Ackerman would arm all persons to mount an effective defense of
valued personal interests: "Whenever any person finds any of his substantive
interests blocked by the legal protection of the interests of competing. citizens, he
has a prima facie right to demand a hearing at which he is provided with some
reason explaining why the law is protecting others at his expense.""
1993).
'0 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 127 (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought)
(William Rehg trans., 1997). It should be noted that not all recent reform proposals are
driven by a desire to "reconstruct" the constitutional order or legal education based on
"high" regime principles. In reaction to "high" theories of reform, some law professors argue
that legal education needs to be reconfigured to give greater weight to practical or vocational
skills. See Timothy W. Floyd, Legal Education and the Vision Thing, 31 GA. L. REv. 853
(1997).
"1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICEINTHELIBERALSTATE 375 (1980) [hereinafter
SOCIAL JUSTICE). An argument that a new constitutional order already has emerged appears
in Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional Aspirations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1999).
12 SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 375-76.
13 Revolution, supra note 7, at 2349.
'4 SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 374; RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 100.
Ackerman freely admits that his labors are not limited to influencing thinking within the
academy. He is interested in "[s]peaking [t]ruth to [p]ower" so as to give some direction to
the political life of the American people. Revolution, supra note 7, at 2347-48. See also
Robert Post's "public discourse" view of democracy that permits all persons to embrace the
government and laws as their own due to their engagement in communicative processes,
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
273, 310-12 (1995). Robert F. Drinan has issued his own call for lawyers to confront
injustice as "moral architects" of a social order based on respect for human rights. See
Robert F. Drinan, New Horizons in the Role of Law Schools in Teaching Legal Ethics, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 347, 354 (1995).
"s RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 98. Jerry Mashaw's reflections on a "dignity
theory" of administrative due process point in a "conversational" direction. See Mashaw,
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Ackerman's principaltarget is the "sinful opposition to the trimphant activist
state" that he primarily associates with persons who subscribe to the laissez-faire
view of government."I Hence his attack on the "capitalist ideological hegemony"
that he believes prevents us from understanding and defending our true interests.' 7
Fifty years after he claims the New Deal occasioned the development of a "new
social consciousness in: America," Ackerman argues, that the existing order
continues to suffer from both structural and substantive ills: governing institutions
perpetuate the unequal distribution of political and economic "power" at the same
time that they fail to promote social justice." Embracing the principle of popular
sovereignty as the critical feature of ajust democracy, he is left to trust the people
to make the choices he would make about the content of public policies or even
about the character of the republic.'9 His extensive writings are in the service'of
promoting just this result. What he can hope for is that as a participant, in an
ongoing "liberal conversation" he will be successful in getting the people to
subscribe to his views on such matters as social welfare policy. His position is
similar'to that described by Woodrow Wilson in his 1887 essay on administration:
the person who desires to reform existing institutions must first shake up the people
to get their attention and then instruct them in the ideals that he wishes them to
endorse."0 In this connection, Ackerman is looking especially to the legal
profession for allies to assist him in carrying out a modern day version of the
centennial-era project described by Wilson. As with Wilson, Ackerman is
convinced that the stakes involve the very dignity and legitimacy of the United
supra note 8, at 930. Justice William Brennan is closely identified with dignity theory. A
concise summary and defense of hisjurisprudence of"libertarian dignity" appears in FRANK
1. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999). The "costs" of this jurisprudence are
reviewed in DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN JR.,
82-88, 126-30, 159-67 (1997). For a discussion of the argument that personal autonomy is
critical to our status as fully free and rational persons, see Charles Fried, The New First
Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992).
,6 RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 21. Interestingly, Mark Tushnet argues that the
New Deal/Great Society order associated with the "activist state" has been replaced by a
new "minimalist" constitutional order. See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 30-33; see also
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1520.
" RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 83.
18 Id. at 2, 22, 74, 94, 96-97.
19 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 414-17. For Ackerman,
the time has come for the people to "retake control of their government." Id. at 3.
20 Woodrow Wilson, The Study ofAdministration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. (1887).
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States as a democratic nation.2
Ackerman is only one of a number of legal scholars who have been actively
advancing rights-sensitive "models" of a reconstituted American republic or
controversial interpretations of the underlying premises and ends of the
constitutional system fashioned at the Federal Convention of 1787. Richard Posner
and other members of the so-called "law and economics school" have made
considerable progress in securing converts to their argument that efficiency (wealth
maximization) explains the operations of our system of law and deserves to be
embraced as a desirable guiding principle by members of the legal profession.22
While Posner sees the economic theory of law as "the most promising positive
theory of law extant,"23 he acknowledges that "there is more to notions of justice
than a concern with efficiency." 4 The latter concession, however, does not lead
him to have reservations about the overall utility of the economic approach to law
since he believes that "economics can provide value clarification by showing the
society what it must give up to achieve a noneconomic ideal ofjustice."23
Theories that accentuate individual rights and equal protection have an obvious
appeal in a republic whose creedal document emphasizes natural equality and
inalienable rights. The Declaration of Independence set the terms for the
deliberations of the constitution-makers who gathered in Philadelphia. Appeals to
efficiency A la Posner's, however, have their own attractiveness in a Lockean-style
commercial society that invites people to seek comfortable or commodious
preservation. The pursuit of efficiency tends to be presented as a value-neutral
enterprise that fits well with the citizen/consumer sovereignty principle associated
with democratic government. 6 Like Ackerman, Posner makes it clear that he is
taking a rights-sensitive stand in his fight to influence the way in which law is
taught and practiced.27 Again like Ackerman, Posner believes that much is at stake
2i If one Harvard law professor is right, Ackerman should be gratified by the "charge"
commonly given to lawyers at professional gatherings: "In the Law Day rhetoric of bar
association officials, exhortations to uphold the rule of law increasingly have given way to
self-serving portrayals of lawyers as vindicators of an ever-expanding array of claims and
rights." MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 5 (1994).
22 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 581-87 (5th ed. 1998);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 6 (1981). Posner dates the serious impact
of economic analysis on legal theory to the 1960s. See POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE,
supra, at 50.
23 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 22, at 26.
24 Id. at 30.
25 ld. at 24, 26.
26 See CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIALJUSTICE 14 (1997); see also STEVEN
E. RHOADS, THE ECONOMISTS' VIEW THE WORLD: GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1989).
27 One of the distinctions that Posner makes between economics of law theory and
Jeremy Bentham's type of utilitarianism is the greater sensitivity of the former to
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in the debate among "high theorists."2 He explained at the end of the 1990s the
concerns that motivated him to "flay" the purveyors of much of contemporary moral
and constitutional theory: "The answer is that they are influential in the law schools
and that their influence is pernicious; it is deflecting academic lawyers from their
vital role ...of generating the knowledge that the judges and other practical
professionals require if they are to maximize the social utility of law."29
Another contender for the heart and soul of the legal profession, including
instructors as well as practitioners, Ronald Dworkin has gained considerable
attention for his defense of a "moral reading" of the Constitution that accentuates
principles of personal freedom and equality." The aim of his most important
scholarship has been to advance "a particular way of reading and enforcing a
political constitution," that is, a "moral reading" that "brings political morality into
the heart of constitutional law" in a fashion that supports a "community of
independent moral agents," the only type of arrangement that satisfies his test of a
"genuine political community."3" In practice, Dworkin's "genuine political
community" would assign considerable weight to individual rights or freedoms and,
like Justice Louis Brandeis in Whitney v. California,32 impose substantial limits on
the government's ability to restrain rights in the name of preserving social order or
protecting physical property." In addition to looking for the inclusion of key
rights-based claims that are especially valued within the American democratic system. See
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 3.
28 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)
[hereinafter PROBLEMATICS].
29 Id at xi. With natural law theorists and proponents of radical egalitarianism and
reactionary populism in mind, Posner bluntly summed up the task that he and other scholars
should be attending to: "Constitutional scholars would be more helpful to the courts and to
society as a whole if they examined constitutional cases and doctrines in relation not to what
passes as theory in jurisprudential circles but rather to the social context of constitutional
issues, their causes, their costs, and their consequences." Id. at x.
30 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 2 (1996). Rogers Smith, Professor of
Government at Yale, similarly argues that substantive values are more critically important
to political legitimacy than democratic proceduralism. See Rogers M. Smith, Legitimating
Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE L. J. 2039, 2073-75 (1999).
3! DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 30, at 2, 26. Two decades before the
appearance of Freedom's Law, Dworkin used the phrase "taking rights seriously" to
summarize his test for a government that is worthy of respect. DWORKIN, TAKINO RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 204-05 (1977). With such criteria in mind, and perhaps looking
to address concerns raised by his own writings, he included in Freedom's Law a declaration
that Americans should be optimistic about the chances that the United States can satisfy its
(and Dworkin's) high moral ideals. DWORKN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 30, at 38.
32 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
31 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 204. A classic expression
of Brandeis's thoughts on the balance to be struck between appeals to First Amendment
rights such as speech on the one hand and governmental interests in order on the other,
2001] 391
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substantive moral principles in the nation's legal code (e.g., protection for freedom
of thought), Dworkin assigns considerable weight to the interpretation given those
principles by governmental institutions. He takes special exception to the
unwillingness (typically on grounds of democratic legitimacy) ofjudges, lawyers,
and scholars to accept a "moral reading" of the law as both intellectually and
politically credible. 4 Interestingly, his argument is not that moral reasoning itself
is completely anathema to judges. His real quarrel with judges follows from his
perception of their unwillingness to admit openly that moral principles can provide
a sufficient foundation for judicial decision-making." In sharp contrast to Posner,
only the open or public use of moral reasoning will satisfy the criteria Dworkin sets
for a political order that merits the respect of an enlightened democratic citizenry.
True legitimacy for the constitutional order (including its democratic bona fides)
rests not on rigid adherence to the principle of popular sovereignty or majoritarian
preferences for Dworkin, but on the maintenance of a political culture based on
rights principles of personal liberty and equality. Reliance on nonmajoritarian
procedures for governance under his "constitutionalist" view of democracy should
occasion no "moral regret."36 To the chagrin of restraintists, his "moral reading"
of the Constitution leaves the door open to Brennanesque-style judicial activism3 7
James Boyd White ranks with Dworkin, Ackerman, and Posner as a major
appears in his concurrence in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
14 See DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 1-6.
's See id. at 3-4. He laments the "potent grip" that majoritarian premises have had on the
"imagination" of practitioners and scholars alike. Id. at 18.
36 Id. at 17.
" Dworkin works hard to respond to charges that his approach permits open-ended
judicial decision-making, but clearly he does not accept the constraints that Justice Antonin
Scalia or Robert Bork would impose on the judiciary. Dworkin summarized his position well
in 1996: "We are governed by what our lawmakers said-by the principles they laid
down-not by any information we might have about how they themselves would have
interpreted those principles or applied them in concrete cases." Id. at 10, 11-12. For
Dworkin's criticism of Scalia and Bork, see id. at 13. Some complementary reflections on
Justice Brennan appear at id. at 132-33, 213. Compare the reasoning advocated by Dworkin
with Richard Posner's claim that "legal issues should not be analyzed with the aid of moral
philosophy, but should instead be approached pragmatically." ECONOMIC ANALYSISOF LAW,
supra note 22, at viii, 98. Posner sees Dworkin's moralistic approach as being in the pursuit
of "egalitarian natural justice" Id. at 15 1. It should be noted that Posner's separation of
pragmatism from moral philosophy is not uncontroversial in itself. For the application of his
"ethics of wealth maximization" to the problem of racial discrimination, see POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at Part IV. James Boyd White of Michigan Law
School is one of a number of scholars who believe that economic reasoning is not only
limited in its application to human experience but can encourage worrisome policies. See
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 82-86 (1990) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS
TRANSLATION]. A thoughtful consideration of Brennan's judicial activism appears in
MICHELMAN, supra note 15.
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figure in the contemporary debate on how best to engage-in legal reasoning and
teach students to think about constitutional law and the legal order. White invites
lawyers to view law as a literary activity through which they can "help to create
new sets of relations in the present and future."38 Without embracing the position
that original intentions are unintelligible or indecipherable, White argues that texts
must be approached as having a life of their own. 9 White describes his goal as
illuminative, not re-constitutive; that is, his self-described purpose is to make
lawyers conscious of the nature of the reasoning that he believes is characteristic
of American law. At the same time, he sees the method he describes as one that
fosters "cultural change" and promotes moral "sympathy.' 'M0 In keeping with the
dominant aim of so much of the "reconstructive" movement, White freely admits
that he wishes to be a voice for openness in a society that is too much given to
assertiveness and close-mindedness."4 White's project is decidedly "political" in
nature, and he acknowledges as much. 2 What is common to Ackerman, Posner,
Dworkin, and White is the opening that they give courts, lawyers, and/or
bureaucrats for shaping the way of life of the American people. 3
In sum, Ackerman, Dworkin, White, and Posner are marketing wares that play
on important impulses in the psyche of the American people at the same time that
they are fighting for the attention and assistance of the legal community. As
evidenced by their labors, much of the effort to reconstitute, redefine or rediscover
the core legal and governmental principles of the American republic is packaged in
the language of rights and includes vigorous affirmations of individual dignity and
38 HERACLES' Bow, supra note 6, at xiii; see JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 37,
at 17-19. Law is a "compositional art," that is, a "set of activities by which minds use
language to make meaning and establish relations with others." Id. at 17.
39 See HERACLES' BOW, supra note 6, at 88.
40 See id. at 104. Additional references to his goal of "bringing to consciousness" the
nature of law as a "compositional art" can be found in JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note
37, at 19. It is significant that White's deconstruction of the Declaration of Independence
leads him to declare that this is an "inspirational," not an "intellectual," text, a document
about "feelings" not "fundamental truths." JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR
MEANING 239 (1984). This devaluation of the "ideational" significance of the Declaration
flies in the face of the Lincolnian reading of the document.
41 See HERACLES' BOW, supra note 6, at 21.
42 See id.
43 While it is a common assumption that "liberal" theorists are comfortable with
independent judicial decision-making, Posner, who is not a poster child of liberal
jurisprudence, rejects the hard positivist position that judges who issue decisions in the
insterstices of the law are acting "outside the law." He includes in his "pragmatic" approach
to legal decision-making a basis for judicial "civil disobedience" as a device for retarding
"destabilizing innovations in public policy by the populist branches." Still, Posner claims
not to be a proponent of judges seeking to "remake society." POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 96-97, 107, 143-44.
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equality. The stakes in this exercise are considerable for the participants as well as
for the American people. Ackerman's efforts to discredit the law and economics
movement'are informed by the conviction that the "Chicago School" promotes a
regime whose members are not guaranteed a "fair share of economic power," a
regime with which he is uncomfortable." For their part, scholars who celebrate the
virtues of welfare economics fear the openingto heavy-handed governmental action
that accompanies Ackerman's call for a "more liberal power structure" in the
service of a "more humane and just society 4 The success or failure of an
Ackerman or Posner will not only shape the teaching of constitutional law, but
governmental operations as well, including the activities of the courts, which in turn
will affect our way of life. To borrow from J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson's
1998 Harvard Law Review essay on the canon debate in constitutional law, "the
way in which constitutional law is taught may affect the development of
constitutional doctrine." There is no doubt that most legal scholars, and
practitionerswith scholarly credentials such as Posner, concur in this assessment.47
In a society where laws establish the boundaries of most private and public
practices, what material gets taught and how it is presented inevitably will have
some effect on the way lawyers think about the constitutional order in its grandest
dimensions, including affairs that fall not only in the legal realm, but in the arena
of politics as well.
II. GROUND ZERO: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE CLASSROOM
If constitutional law texts and law school courses traditionally were heavy on
structural issues and governmental powers and light on rights and liberties, there is
4, Repeated references to the Chicago School can be found in RECONSTRUCTING, supra
note 7, at 94. Posner's application of economic analysis to legislative decision-making leads
him to make declarations that invite the pleas of reformers such as Ackerman that a
"reconstruction" of the legal system is in order. Witness Posner's assertion that a
"characteristic product" of the legislative process is "the unprincipled redistribution of
wealth in favor of politically effective interest groups." ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 22, at 586.
45 SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 376; RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 78.
46 J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 1001 (1998). Ackerman acknowledged in a Yale Law Journal article that
appeared in 1999, that his enterprise will be advantaged if he can influence both the teaching
of constitutional law and the beliefs of "younger members of the legal academy." The next
step is to see that the "new learning trickles into the practical life of the profession,
incorporating itself slowly into judicial opinions at various levels of the hierarchy-until at
long last, it trickles up to the Supremes." Revolution, supra note 7, at 2279, 2348-49.
17 A provocative and highly critical examination of the contemporary state of the legal
profession, and the cultural implications for the country, appears in GLENDON, supra note
21.
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considerable evidence that this distribution was upset sometime after the 1960s.
Law students in the nineteenth century who cut their teeth on Joseph Story's
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States would have associated
constitutional law with the study of history and governmental powers.4" As late as
1970, Gunther and Dowling's heavily-used constitutional law text, which first
appeared in 1937, devoted more than half its pages to sulbjects touching
"constitutionalism" and the "structure of the government."'9 .By 1997, the Gunther
and Sullivan casebook (the successor to Gunther and Dowling) devoted more than
half its pages to rights-related material."0 It is the imbalance that seemingly favors
rights over powers, and not the dominance of "high theory" over "practical, useful
research," that is the subject of the present Essay."' Considering the decisions of
the Warren Court in First and Fourteenth Amendment areas and the issues
highlighted *by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and, 1960s, the
redistribution of space in casebooks between powers and rights perhaps is not
surprising. 2 This is the not the same as saying, however, that this development is
unimportant or that there is no price to pay for the heavy weighting of rights over
powers. There is good reason to worry that the diminished space and time allotted
to powers may occasion the emergence of a simplistic and distorted understanding
of what is required to maintain a competent and decent republic of rights. In short,
what finally may be in the balance is the very preservation of the republic of rights
that took form in 1787.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century treatises on constitutional law, as well
as casebooks on the subject, devoted considerable space to structural or institutional
topics such as separation of powers and the powers of the national government and
the states. An examination of early casebooks carried out in the late 1990s by
Balkin and Levinson led them to conclude that "[i]n many of these early casebooks,
individual rights issues are considered secondary.."" The first treatises and
48 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
49 GERALD GUNTHER& NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (8th ed. 1970).
50 GERALD GUNTHER& KATHLEEN M. SULuVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed, 1997).
' On the claim that law schools are sacrificing practical instruction to the advancement
of the philosophical and political agendas of law professors, see PROBLEMATICS, supra note
28, at 281-95.
52 The extent to which rights-concerns dominate the law school landscape provoked
Balkin and Levinson to suggest that "someone wishing to become a 'player' in the legal
academy is well advised to become adept in the jurisprudence of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, rather than to study and write about the power of the President to engage in
foreign adventures without prior approval of Congress." Balkin & Levinson, supra note 46,
at 964, 979 n.55.
53 Id. at 1010. They note that James Parker Hall's 1927 casebook, Illustrative Cases on
Constitutional Law, devoted primary coverage to structural issues. Id. at 1010 n. 146.
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casebooks on the Constitution appear to have reflected the attention leading
founders such as James Madison gave to the institutions and powers of the different
governments. It is also true that these treatises and casebooks reflected the absence
of large numbers of individual rights cases in the Supreme Court's caseload during
much of the period from the inauguration of George Washington to the first decades
of the twentieth century, but this situation is itself revealing of the judiciary's
historical deference to the government's pursuit of self-preservation and the
protection of an American way of life. 4
Joseph Story's handling ofthe Constitution is particularly revealing considering
the influence of his writings on the study of law through the nineteenth century.
The 1833 edition of his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
combines a brief history of the United States and a review of the "nature of the
Constitution" with extended comments on the institutions and powers of the
national government. The dutiful reader of Story's Commentaries would be well-
versed in the responsibilities of the different departments of the government as well
as the powers invested in each. As importantly, Story took pains to establish the
connection between effectiveness in government and the enjoyment of the "common
liberties, and the common rights of the people."" What might be called the
traditional approach to the study of rights created an almost seamless connection
between personal or individual liberties and the requirements of competence and
effectiveness in government.
James Madison, long recognized as the "father" of the Constitution, reminded
his contemporaries that a republic of rights can only succeed if the government is
capable of "controlling" the governed. 6 According to Madison in Federalist Paper
No. 5i, the "first object" or task of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 was to craft a government that could effectively "control" the people."
This consideration is well represented in Story's Commentaries. The practice of
devoting considerable attention in constitutional study and reasoning to institutional
or structural elements of the governmental system, including the powers of the
different branches of the national government, persisted well into the twentieth
"4 Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's generous understanding of what the states
and the national government might do in the name of protecting a broadly-defined right in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that polygamy is not protected under
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause), and in early twentieth-century cases such as
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (holding that a state may punish speech
proposing Communist principles); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that
a state may punish utterances endangering the government); and Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919) (holding that pamphlets discouraging the draft is not protected by
freedom of speech or of the press).
" STORY, supra note 48, at 193, 219.
56 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 321-22 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
17 See id
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century. This practice was reflected in the makeup of casebooks as well as in the
traditional division of constitutional law into segments devoted to powers and
rights. Until recently when many law schools sought to incorporate more room for
electives into.the curriculum, a full semester or half-year was devoted to the study
of governmental powers. The consideration of powers occurred prior to any
substantial review of rights-related material.
While the division between powers and rights is still a fixture in the teaching
of constitutional law, there is abundant evidence that case material having a
connection with rights-based claims or substantial personal interests occupies
considerably more space in casebooks and constitutional law courses than was true
only a few decades ago. In many instances, constitutional law is now a one-
semester rather than a two-semester offering, which at a minimum compresses the
time available for the teaching of both rights and powers. Emory University Law
School's on-line catalog for 1999-2000, for example, listed a one-semester first-year
course in constitutional law that covered the powers of the national government and
states while providing an "introduction to individual rights, with emphasis on the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clauses,
First Amendment problems, and evolving doctrines of privacy.""Ss A 1999-2000
listing for Constitutional Law 100 at Harvard described a course that combines case
material on congressional power, federalism, and separation of powers with Equal
Protection Clause cases and some attention to the First Amendment. Columbia Law
School's "Foundation Curriculum" includes a basic constitutional law course that
again combines attention to institutional and powers-related issues with materials
that illuminate "the theory and content of individual rights under the
Constitution."59
The impression that the combination of powers and rights cases in basic
constitutional law offerings reflects a "balanced" treatment of powers and rights in
the teaching of constitutional law, however, can be deceptive since many law
schools offer "Constitutional Law I1" classes devoted entirely to First and/or
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Columbia's 1999-2000 internet site lists the First
s Emory Law School Course Catalog, available at http://www.Law.emory.edu/ LAW/
CATALOG/courses.html.
" Columbia Law School, Curriculum, available at http://www.Law.columbia.edu/
academics/foundation. Also note the 1999-2000 basic constitutional law listings at the
University of Kansas, available at http://www.ukans.edu/academics; American University,
available athttp://www.wcl.american.edu/courses; Franklin Pierce, available at http://www.
fplc.edu, and Case Western Reserve, available at http://www.cwru.edu. The online
description of Constitutional Law I at New York University states that "the goal of this
course is to provide a one semester summary coverage of all the major subject matter areas
of constitutional law;" available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/recordsregistration/
fallOO/coursedescription.html.
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and Fourteenthi Amendments as customary Constitutional Law II topics.'
Constitutional Law.ll at Emory, an upper division elective class, is described as "a
study of individual rights problems," with "substantial coverage of equal protection,
free speech/free press, and civil rights issues."' Constitutional Law I at Cornell
Law School covers "structural aspects of the Constitution" as well as "certain rights
provisions" while Constitutional Law II focuses on the First Amendment and the
"vindication of constitutional rights in civil cases." '62 Under "constitutional law,"
Boston University School of Law's internet site for 1999-2000 described a basic
constitutional law course that examined traditional structural/institutional issues as
well as individual rights followed by a specialized course entitled "Political and
Civil Liberties.""3 In short, where the two-semester sequence remains, rights cases
often share one semester with powers and then take up much if not all of an entire
second semester themselves. A dramatic example of the change that has occurred
appeared in Georgetown University Law School's online curriculum guide for
1999-2000 which identified Constitutional Law II: Individual Rights and Liberties
as the "basic" constitutional law course for the "cluster" of courses in the "field of
constitutional law and government."
Since casebooks both determine and mirror what occurs in the classroom, it is
not surprising that the expanded treatment of rights that is visible in catalog
descriptions of constitutional law courses finds its reflection in the material that
makes its way into texts. The thirteenth edition (1997) of what is now the Gunther
and Sullivan text devotes more than eleven hundred of its fifteen hundred and fifty
pages to rights-related case material.' Where the sections on separation of powers,
the commerce power, or the "structure of government" each cover less than one
hundred pages, the sections on suspect classifications and freedom of speech cover
almost two hundred pages each." In short, material typically associated with
o Columbia Law School, Curriculum, available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/
academics/upperclass-curr/constitutional.htm.
6 Emory University School of Law, Law School Catalog, Course Descriptions, available
at http://www.law.emory.edu/LAW/CATALOG/courses.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2000).
62 Comell Law School, Course Descriptions, available at http://www.lawschool.
comell.edu/admissions/courses9900.htm.
63 Boston University School of Law, available at http://www.bu.edu/law/jd/curriculum.
" Available at http://data.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab-clusters. For examples of
sequences that follow the classical division between powers and rights, see the 1999-2000
online catalog or curriculum descriptions for the law schools at Vanderbilt available at
http://www.vanderbilt.law.edu/law/courses/home.html, Indiana University available at
http://www.iulaw.indy.indiana.edu, Northern Illinois University available at http://www.
niu.edu/claw.index.htm, the University of Wisconsin available athttp://www.law.wisc.edu
and Samford University's Cumberland School of Law available athttp://www.samford.edu/
schools/law/cdmain.htn.
63 See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 50.
66 See id.
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"powers" accounts for a little more than a third of the text. By contrast, more than
fifty percent (781/1453) of the eighth edition (1970) of Gunther and Dowling, the
precursor to Gunther and Sullivan, was devoted to material that fell under headings
such as "constitutionalism!' and "structure of government."' The eighth edition
contains only a one page note on "'suspect' distinctions" and combines equal
protection material in two sections of one hundredrand twenty:pages. s The third
edition (1999) of Louis Fisher'sAmerican Constitutional Law devotes less than five
hundred pages to cases and reading material on such subjects as federalism,
separation of powers, and the jurisdiction of the courts, while material dealing with
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees fill more than seven hundred
pages.' 9 The 1997 edition of Erwin Chemerinsky's constitutional law text devoted
roughly three hundred and fifty pages to traditional themes in the powers area and
approximately seven hundred pages to rights material. While the sections on
legislative and executive powers together cover fewer than one hundred and twenty
pages, the section on First Amendment Expression alone covers more than two
hundred pages. Religion cases occupy another seventy pages. 0 A similar division
between "powers" and "rights" appears in the seventh edition (2000) of Craig
Ducat's Constitutional Interpretation, divided into two volumes since its first
appearance."' Ducat combines five hundred pages of powers-related material in the
first volume compared to over fourteen hundred pages of material in the volume
devoted to "rights of the individual." 2 Texts having an undergraduate rather than
a law school complexion also tend to assign the majority of the space to material
having some connection with rights-related themes. The second edition of Stephens
and Scheb's American Constitutional Law devotes three hundred and thirty pages
to powers-related cases, but five hundred-plus pages are given to subjects such as
privacy, equal protection, civil rights, and First Amendment freedom. The 1997
edition of David O'Brien's Constitutional Law and Politics offers readers more
than eight hundred pages of material on "powers" subjects (Vol. 1), considerably
67 See GUNTHER & DOWLING, supra note 49.
61 See id
69 Louis FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1999). West Group's three-
volume MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW devotes one volume [II1] to traditional rights issues
[770 pages] and two volumes to topics generally associated with rights: "The Individual and
the Government" [Vol. 1, 497 pages] and "Equal Protection" [Vol. II, 814 pages].
70 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1997).
7" See CRAIG DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (7th ed. 2000).
7 See id Examples of casebooks and supplementary constitutional law texts that reflect
similar distributions of space between powers and rights material abound. See DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS I (1997) (devoting approximately two-thirds of its
space to rights-related issus (three hundred and thirty pages out of five hundred)); DONALD
LIVELY ETAL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2000) (devoting more than nine hundred pages
out of roughly fourteen hundred and fifty to material associated with individual rights and
equality themes).
2001]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
more than the standard law school casebook." This two-volume set, however, still
reflects the dominance of rights in the contemporary field of constitutional law.
The civil rights/liberties volume is in excess of fifteen hundred pages. Again with
this set, it is easy to imagine instructors in year-long courses wanting to get a head
start on the "rights" material during the "powers" semester. 4
It may be useful to note that nothing in this review of casebooks and course
descriptions is intended to suggest that students are not invited to reflect on
governmental powers when dissecting rights cases-they are. Nor does this Essay
presume to suggest that students only study governmental powers in courses on
constitutional law-they do not. But, then, these things always were true. What
has changed is the extent of the tilt in the direction of rights that characterizes the
study of constitutional law per se. What is important is the effect of this "tilt" or
imbalance on the education of an important class of persons in our society.75 The
struggle going on between Ackerman and Posner for the allegiance and support of
the legal community is understandable. Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard Law School
has repeatedly invited scholars to reflect on the state of the legal profession
precisely because of the disproportionate influence of lawyers and judges, and law
professors, on the politics and culture of the country. 6
The current valuation of rights and powers in constitutional law study and
discourse contrasts sharply with the situation that prevailed until rather late in the
twentieth century. As scholars like Ackerman and Dworkin are involved in a
"political" project, so the case for seeking some balance in the teaching of rights
and powers can best be made on fundamental political grounds, that is, with
attention to the way of life of the American people. As the next section attempts to
demonstrate, by reinvigorating reflection on powers-related issues, the legal
profession can do its part to promote sobriety, and hence an added dose of
prudence, in constitutional reflection and discourse by a democratic citizenry whose
" See DAVID M. O'BREN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (3d ed. 1997).
7' The tilt in the direction of rights-related case material is not a 1990s phenomenon. The
1980 edition of Kaupe and Beytagh's casebook Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials
devoted approximately five hundred and fifty pages to material related to institutional
concerns ordinarily associated with the "powers" section of constitutional law and over one
thousand pages (457-1598) to themes touching Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees.
" The perception that the contemporary historical period can legitimately be
characterized by the weight being given to rights is reflected in academic book titles such
as DEBRA L. DELAET, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS (2000); see also
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 46, at 1010.
76 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Symposium, Individualism and Communitarianism in
Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 385
(1993); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. REV. 519
(1992); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV.
477 (1991).
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natural impulse is to make self-serving demands in the name of individual freedom
and autonomy. In the constitutional reasoning and jurisprudence of figures such as
John Marshall and James Madison can be found considerable support for striking
a balance between attention to powers and rights.
III. PRUDENCE AND SOBRIETY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
As Ackerman, Dworkin, Posner, and White all have in their mind's eye a
desirable state of affairs that they would like to see realized in practice, so leading
figures of the founding such as George Washington, James Madison, and John
Marshall were actively engaged in eliciting popular support for institutions and
practices that they believed would yield beneficial results. Of all the Founders or
near-Founders, Marshall exerted the greatest influence over constitutional and legal
reasoning." He remains a monumental figure in constitutional history, dwarfing all
his predecessors and successors within the judicial department.
While reminders of Marshall's defense of an independent judiciary remain a
staple of legal scholarship, what is not so visible is his sober reasoning in matters
involving individual rights and liberties. This reasoning, which he considered so
essential to the success of the Founders' "experiment" in democratic government
warrants attention even as some scholars declare in the aftermath of the Cold War
that the American version of the modern democratic nation state is invincible and
represents the culmination of several millennia of political history.' Support for
this rather optimistic claim notwithstanding, there is no reason to believe that the
United States is free of the challenges, some a product of human nature itself, that
led Madison and other delegates at the Constitutional Convention to look for
"devices of prudence" to deal with factious impulses and the fallibility of human
beings. 9 Few officials from the extended founding period were forced to reflect on
the constitutional dimensions of both the means and ends of the new governmental
system more deeply than John Marshall. The fact that he was a self-conscious actor
in the unfolding of the new republic adds both to the significance and utility of his
legal thought. The shape and destiny of the American republic owes much to his
jurisprudence. For all these reasons, recourse to his reflections on the character of
a thoughtful constitutional jurisprudence should yield valuable instruction for
persons engaged in the current debate on the relative weightings of rights and
Perhaps no greater compliment was paid to Marshall than by his colleague Justice
Joseph Story: "Will you excuse me for saying that your appointment to the Bench has in my
judgment more contributed under providence to the preservation of the true principles of the
constitution than any other circumstance in our domestic history." Letter from Joseph Story
(June 21, 1821), in 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 176 (Charles F. Hobson ed.)
(1998) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS].
78 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
79 Id
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powers in the study and practice of constitutional law.
It is commonplace in American law to associate John Marshall with the
vindication of individual rights and the defense of an independent judiciary. It is
just these themes that get attention in most treatments of his opinion in Marbury v.
Madison." His declaration in Marbury that the United States will cease to deserve
to be called a nation of laws if our laws do not protect rights, along with his defense
of an independentjudiciary armed with the power to review the constitutionality of
the actions of coordinate branches of the government, anticipated by more than a
century the role that courts would play in articulating First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and in enforcing limits on governmental power.
Marshall's conviction that the protection of rights and individual liberty by an
independentjudiciary was a primary test of legitimate government did not suddenly
arise with his appointment to the United States Supreme Court. Among his earliest
law notes can be found the statement that "for every injury a man shall have an
action & for every right he has a remedy."'" Late in life, he would write that the
American Revolution was "a war of principle, against a system hostile to political
liberty, from which oppression was to be dreaded, not against actual oppression.""
For Marshall, liberty or freedom for the American people, the flip side of which is
protection against governmental tyranny, was the animating principle of the whole
independence movement. While representing Fauquier County in the House of
Delegates in 1783 as a member of the Council of State, Marshall signed his name
to an "opinion" declaring that a law giving the executive the power to inquire into
certain actions taken by county magistrates was "contrary to the fundamental
principles of our constitution." 3 The Council's response to the Governor ends with
the observation that action against a magistrate should commence in a proceeding
before a "Court of Justice."" Another classic example of his attention to judicial
protection for the rights of individuals appears in remarks offered on June 10, 1788,
during the Virginia Ratifying Convention. Although not reputed to possess Patrick
Henry's capacity for stirring oratory, Marshall's reflections on the failure of the
confederation system to protect the fundamental procedures of free government
"0 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Without knowledge of the great stature that Marshall
would later acquire due to his opinions in cases like Marbury, a resident of Richmond
anticipated the reputation that Marshall would enjoy in a remark made at a reception for him
on his return from France in 1798: "When future generations persue [sic] the history of
America, they will find the name of Marshall on its sacred page as one of the brightest
ornaments of the age in which he lived." Editorial Nbte, in 3 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note
75, at 494 (William C. Stinchcombe and Charles T. Cullen eds.) (1979) (quoting VA.
GAZETTE, AND GEN. ADVISOR, Aug. 14, 1798).
sI Law Notes (June 1780), in lid. at 51 (Herbert A. Johnson ed.) (1974).
82 Letter to Edward Everett (August 2, 1826), in I id. at 299.
s Council of State Opinion, February 20, 1783, 1 id. at 97.
14 1 id. at 97.
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combined great passion with legal argumentation that would have resonated with
the delegates:
No mischief-no misfortune ought to deter us from a strict observance
of justice and public faith. Would to Heaven that these principles had
been observed under the present Government! Had this been the case,
the friends of liberty would not be so willing now to part with it. Can
we boast that our Government is founded on these maxims? Can we
pretend to the enjoyment of political freedom, or security, when we are
told, that a man has been, by an act of Assembly, struck out of existence,
without a trial byjury-without examination-without being confronted
with his accusers and witnesses-without the benefits of the law of the
land? Where is our safety, when we are told, that this act wasjustifiable,
because the person was not a Socrates?... Shall it be a maxim, that a
man shall be deprived of his life without the benefit of law?... Shall it
be a'maxim, that Government ought not to be empowered to protect
virtue? 5
Although Marshall was known to worry about abusive uses of personal
liberties, he never shied away from acknowledging their fundamental status in a free
society. Such was his defense of freedom of speech in a letter to French Foreign
Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand dated April 3, 1798:
The Genius of the Constitution & the opinions of the people of the
United States cannot be overruled by those who administer the
government. Among those principles deemed sacred in America, among
those precious rights considered as forming the bulwark of their
85 Speech (June 10, 1788), in 1; id. at 256. Marshall's reflections on jury trials in 1788
anticipated successful action he took as a first-term congressman in 1799 that resulted in
requiring that a jury decide the question of bankruptcy and the amount of debt in dispute.
See Editorial Note, in 4 id. at 34 (Charles T. Cullen ed.) (1984). Marshall, however,
understood that juries without the guidance of judges could do mischief:
The trial by jury, which under its present modification we so justly prize, would
become dangerous and might possibly destroy itself, if the superintendance and
reasonable control ofjudges were entirely removed. Juries might sometimes be
led by the most unlimited prejudices into such extravagant excesses as would
render it doubtful, whether the institution should be considered as a blessing or
a curse.
Argument (Dec. 4-5, 1790), in 5 id. at 497 (Charles F. Hobson ed.) (1987) (argument in Ross
v. Pynes, 7 Va. 568 (1790)). Interestingly, part of the attack on Marshall's handling of the
Burr treason case was based on his refusal to entrust some critical issues to the jury. See
Editorial Note, in 7 id. at 10 (1993). The Burr case contains Marshall's most revealing
reflections on the right to an impartial jury. See Opinion (August 11, 1807), in 7 id. at 65-69.
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liberties, which the Government contemplates with awful reverence; and
would approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there is no
one, of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the public
mind, than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often carried to
excess, that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness, is seen and
lamented; but the remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an
evil inseparable from the good to which it is allied, perhaps it is a shoot
which cannot be stripped from the stalk, without wounding vitally the
plant from which it is torn. However desirable those measures may be,
which might correct without enslaving the press, they have never yet
been devised in America. No regulations exist which enable the
government to suppress whatever calumnies or invectives any individual
may chuse to offer to the public eye, or to punish such calumnies and
invectives otherwise, than by a legal prosecution in courts, which are
alike open to all who consider themselves as injured."
Significantly, on the subject of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 that regulated
the press, Marshall noted in a letter issued during his campaign for Congress in
1798 that he considered the legislation "useless" and would have voted against the
four acts on the grounds that they are "calculated to create, unnecessarily,
discontents and jealousies at a time when our very existence, as a nation, may
depend on our union.""7
While he was a champion of popular causes at the time of the Revolution,
Marshall was not a sentimental articulator of populist rhetoric that played on the
attachment of the people to their rights. He was a practical and savvy student of
political affairs who had been associated before the ratifying convention with
efforts to insure that Virginia's governmental system, especially its judiciary, was
equal to the needs of the people. 8 The man who once described "experience" as
Letter to Talleyrand (Apr. 3, 1798), in 3, id. at 447 (William C. Stinchcombe and
Charles T. Cullen eds.) (1979). Marshall adds that public officials in the United States are
required to endure vicious attacks: "Nothing can be more notorious than the calumnies &
invectives with which the wise measures & the most virtuous characters of the United States
have been purued and traduced. It is a calamity incident to the nature of liberty." 3 id. at
448.
" Letter to a Freeholder (Sept. 20, 1798), in 3 id. at 505. Evident in this letter is
Marshall's characteristic tendency to place issues, including matters involving rights, in the
context of practical political consideration. See 3 id. at 503-06. He ends his letter with the
observation that he would not vote to extend the life of the Alien and Sedition laws. See 3
id. at 505-06.
u Marshall's early interest in judicial reforms that would improve the efficiency of
Virginia's courts is evident in his work on a failed legislative bill in the mid-1780s. See
Legislative Bill (Dec. 25, 1786), in 1 id. at 193-97 (Herbert A. Johnson ed.) (1974).
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the "parent of wisdom and the great instructor of nations" knew from events he had
witnessed first-hand during the revolutionary periods in America and France that
the habits and opinions of the people would determine whether decent and
competent democratic government would take root and survive in a society. 9 With
the objective of supporting a citizenry capable of sustaining free government, he
joined in 1784 with James Madison, Edmund Randolph, Patrick Henry, and James
Monroe, among others, to form the Virginia Constitutional Society for the purpose
of providing the people of Virginia with "free and frequent information" on matters
affecting their rights and personal interests.9 Later, writing under the pen names
"Aristides" and "Gracchus," Marshall defended Washington's Neutrality
Proclamation on the grounds that it would protect American interests from serious
damage during a period of European conflict.9' In these essays, Marshall urged the
people to use good judgment when forming opinions about national policies and
noted that no good would come from "disgusting the people with their
government." This exercise in civic education includes a reminder that "[n]o
human institution can be free from error, nor can human decisions be uniformly
right."93 He added that a "wise and virtuous people" will have' sober or realistic
political expectations and be capable of resisting the temptations of persons who
would attempt to rally them for unwarranted reasons against their government.94
89 See Address to Congress (Dec. 6, 1799), in 4 id. at 43 (Charles .T. Cullen ed.) (1984).
o See Virginia Constitutional Society Subscription Paper (Apr. 23, 1785), in Iid. at 141
(Herbert A. Johnson ed.) (1974).
9, See Letters to Augustine Davis (Nov. 13, 1793 and Nov. 20, 1793), in 2 id. at 231-47
(Charles T. Cullen and Herbert A. Johnson eds.) (1977).
92 See Letter to Augustine Davis (Nov. 13, 1793), in I id at 238. In a speech in the
House of Representatives on March 7, 1800, he reminded his colleagues of the importance
of "rescueing" public opinion from.. . [bad] prejudices." Speech (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 id
at 82 (Charles T. Cullen ed.) (1984). During the Burr trial, Marshall chided "the gentlemen
on both side" for "endeavourihg [sic] to excite the prejudices of the people." Opinion (June
13, 1807), in 7 id at 37 (Charles F. Hobson ed.) (1993).
3 Letter to Augustine Davis (Oct. 16, 1793), in 2 id. at 221 (Charles T. Cullen and
Herbert A. Johnson eds.) (1977).
" See 2 id. at 222. Marshall singled out James Monroe for special criticism as a result
of his public efforts to turn the people against George Washington's foreign policy. Monroe
published under the pseudonym "Agricola." It is clear from letters andjournal entries written
during his service as an envoy to France in 1797, that Marshall worried about foreign threats
to the independence of the United States. See, e.g., Letter to Washington (Sept. 15, 1797),
in 3 id. at 138-46 (William C. Stinchcombe and Charles T. Cullen eds.) (1979); Journal
Entry (Oct. 30, 1797), in 3 id. at 178-83; Journal Entry (Feb. 26, 1798) in 3 id. at 202-09;
Letter to Talleyrand (Jan. 17, 1798), in 3 id. at 359; Letter to the Citizens of Richmond (Aug.
11, 1798), in 3 id. at 482-83 (observing that he "pray[ed] to Heaven" that America would
never lose the "blessings of liberty and national independence"); Letter to Washington, (Jan.
8, 1799), in 4 id. at 4 (Charles T. Cullen ed.) (1984) (noting again the critical importance of
preserving the new union and American independence). His later efforts to ensure that the
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Especially interesting for a commercial society is Marshall's counsel that the people
remain vigilant lest they be "seduced by a love of ease" into lowering their guard
against threats to the country's independence." He added that such "carelessness"
would be "as criminal as it would be fatal."9
Marshall confidently believed that the American constitutional system merited
special protection because it could satisfy the reasonable expectations of a "wise
and virtuous" citizenry. Indeed, the unrest and discord he witnessed while serving
as an American envoy in Paris provoked him to declare in a note to Charles Lee
dated October 25, 1797, that "[i]t is in America and America only that human
liberty has found an asylum. Let our foreign factions banish her from the United
States and this earth affords her no longer a place of refuge."' This defense of the
United States extended to the judicial system. In a fairly sharp letter that he drafted
to Foreign Minister Talleyrand with the assistance of Charles Pinckney and
Eldridge Gerry, Marshall observed that the French minister would have been well
served by studying America's courts before lodging complaints about how they
handled cases involving deserters: "You would have perceived & admired their
purity. You would have perceived that America may repose herself securely on the
integrity of her Judges."' The flip side of this high esteem for the American
constitutional order was Marshall's belief on the one hand that the national
government must be entrusted with sufficient power to preserve the experiment in
democratic republicanism contrived by the Framers, and his counsel on the other
hand that the people develop habits of law-abidingness and self-restraint.
If Marshall presented himself as a "friend of liberty" and self-government, he
made it clear at the Virginia Ratifying Convention that he was an advocate of "well
regulated Democracy."' He repeatedly gave public expression to his confidence
United States was capable of defending its interests and his uneasiness with actions that
might provoke civil unrest no doubt were strengthened by the events that he witnessed in
Europe. An excellent defense of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation was drafted in the
form of a communique to Foreign Minister Talleyrand by Marshall while in Paris. See Letter
to Talleyrand (Jan. 17, 1798), in 3 id. at 331-81 (William C. Stinchcombe and Charles T.
Cullen eds.) (1979).
"' Address to Congress (Dec. 6, 1799), in 4 id. at 43 (Charles T. Cullen ed.) (1984).
96 4 id.
9' Letter to Charles Lee (Oct. 25, 1797), in 3 id. at 251 (William C. Stinchcombe and
Charles T. Cullen eds.) (1979). In a letter written to the people of Richmond shortly after his
return from France in 1798, Marshall counseled that everything should be done to see that
liberty was never extinguished in the United States. See Letter to Citizens of Richmond
(Aug. 11, 1798), in 3 id. at 483.
9' Response to Talleyrand (Apr. 3, 1798), in 3 id. at 440-41.
9 Speech (June 10, 1788), in Iid. at 256. Approximately 150 years after Marshall spoke
of a "well regulated democracy," Justice Benjamin Cardozo made reference in a much cited
Supreme Court decision to the American commitment to "ordered liberty." See Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The difference between Marshall's phrase and
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in Washington's administration and urged Americans to be careful about embracing
rash attacks on the government. He understood well the dangers that might arise if
the people vacillated in their allegiance to the new government:
Desirable as is at all times a due confidence in our government, it is
peculiarly so in a moment of peril ... , in a moment when the want of
that confidence must impair the means of self defense, must increase a
danger already but too great, and furnish, or at least give the appearance
of furnishing, to a foreign real enemy, those weapons which have so
often been so successfully used."°
As a member of Congress, he decried the efforts of some persons to promote civil
discord: "That any portion of the people of America should permit themselves,
amidst such numerous blessings, to be seduced by the arts and misrepresentations
of designing men into an open resistance of a law of the United States, cannot be
heard without deep and serious regret."''
Marshall's view of human nature supported his fears of civil discord and
anarchy. In the same speech that contained his defense ofjury trials, he remarked
on the "passions of men," their "ambition and avarice," which he believed
"stimulated them to avail themselves of the weakness of others."' ' In a revealing
observation, he went on to declare that "[a] bare sense of duty, or a regard to
propriety is too feeble to induce men to comply with obligations."'0 3 He favored a
decisive response by the state of Massachusetts to Shays Rebellion that would
"impress on the minds ofthe people a conviction that punishment will surely follow
an attempt to subvert the laws & government of the Commonwealth."' 4 This
Cardozo's is the facial emphasis given by the former to political considerations, i.e., the
demands of a "well regulated democracy."
"0 Letter to the Citizens of Richmond, (Aug. 11, 1798), in 3 MARSHALL PAPERS, 1796-
1798 at 484 (William C. Stinchcombe and Charles T. Cullen eds.) (1979).
"01 Address to Congress (Dec. 6, 1799), in 4 id. at 40 (Charles T. Cullen ed.) (1984).
Marshall was given to fears that America would not preserve the gains made during the
Revolution and later from the ratification of the Constitution. See Letter to Harrison Gray
Otis (Aug. 5, 1800), in 4 id. at 205 ("There is a tide in the affairs of nations, of parties, &
of individuals. I fear that of real Americanism is on the ebb.").
02 Speech (June 10, 1788), in l id at 261.
'03 1 id. at 262 (Herbert A. Johnson ed.) (1974). Marshall included a particularly blunt
comment on human behavior in a letter of March 27, 1794 to Archibald Stuart: "Seriously
the[re] [apipears to me every day to be more folly, envy, malice & damned rascality in the
world than there was the day before & I do verily begin to think that plain downright honesty
& unintriguing integrity will be kicked out of doors." 2 id. at 261-62 (Charles T. Cullen and
Herbert A. Johnson eds.) (1977).
'"' Letter to Arthur Lee (Mar. 5, 1787), in l id. at 206 (Herbert A. Johnson ed.) (1974).
Marshall also had an opportunity to witness the results of civil discord in France following
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advice follows from the belief that true liberty is impossible in the absence of order.
Government can be entrusted with real power, but only as long as devices are
employed to link the private interests of political officials to their public trusts.
Always a realist when it came to human behavior, Marshall's view of human nature
became increasingly jaundiced as his ascent to the United States Supreme Court
neared. Writing to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney in 1802, he painted an unflattering
portrait of human affairs: "There is so much in the political world to wound honest
men who have honorable feelings that I am disgusted with it & begin to see things
& indeed human nature through a much more gloomy medium that I once thought
possible."'"5 It would be wrong to conclude from such observations, however, that
Marshall believed that human beings have no redeeming values and that
experiments in democracy were doomed to fail. He understood from his association
with George Washington that honor and public spiritedness could be found in the
human soul. If anything, Marshall's sensitivity to the weaknesses and failings of
human beings made it all the more important in his view that persons of "virtue"
and "wisdom" be selected for public posts and that all officials be held accountable
for the "smallest mal-administration."' In sum, he believed a well-regulated
democracy required that real power be entrusted to officials of fit character who
were subjected to careful scrutiny by an informed citizenry.0 7 There were, in short,
many elements to his vision of a well-functioning republic of rights and, hence,
many places for problems to arise.
Marshall's realism or sobriety spilled over into his perception of the proper role
of the courts in the new constitutional system. As already noted, he lent support
early in his career to the cause of an independent and efficient judiciary, but also
a judiciary that is restrained from interfering with effectiveness in the coordinate
departments of the government. He understood that any commitment to the
protection of rights would only be as good as the country's investment in a properly
functioning court system.'~ This conviction, however, did not lead him to argue for
his appointment by Washington as a special envoy to that country in 1797. See, e.g., Letter
to Washington (Sept. 15, 1797), in 3 id. at 138-46 (William C. Stinchcombe and Charles T.
Cullen eds.) (1979).
" Letter to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Nov. 21, 1802), in 6 id. at 125 (Charles F.
Hobson ed.) (1990). In the same letter, Marshall spoke critically of what he called "[t]he new
doctrine of the perfectability of man," which he believed "begins to exhibit him I think as
an animal much less respectable than he has heretofore been thought." 6 id.
"o Speech at Ratification Convention (June 10, 1788), in I id. at 267 (Herbert A. Johnson
ed.) (1974); cf Letter to James Monroe (Jan. 3, 1784), in I id. at 114; Speech (June 10,
1788), in I id. at 270 (references to virtue and wisdom in public officials).
107 See I id. at 270.
,'O Marshall also believed that an "uprightjudiciary" was the best device for insuring that
suspicious nations treat one another's commercial shipping fairly and not engage in improper
seizures of cargo. Letter to Rufus King (Sept. 10, 1800), in 4 id. at 293 ("Letter to Rufus
King-September 20, 1800"). It was a concern for the integrity of the judiciary as much as
[Vol. 9:2
STATE OF THE CANON IN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW
a judiciary armed with political power or invested with authority to scrutinize any
matter of a constitutional nature. An important pre-Marbury statement of his view
ofjudicial power appears in a speech delivered before the House of Representatives
on March 7, 1800:
By the constitution, the judicial power of the United States is extended
to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, laws and
treaties of the United States; but the resolutions declare the judicial
power to extend to all questions arising under the constitution, treaties
and laws of the United States. If the judicial power extended to every
question under the constitution it would involve almost every subject
proper for legislative discussion and decision; if to every question under
the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost every
subject on which the executive could act. The division of power which
the gentleman had stated, could exist no longer, and the other
departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary... . By extending
the judicial power to all cases in law and equity, the constitution had
never been understood, to confer on that department, any political power
whatever. "
This limited view ofjudicial power represented a major theme of the first segment
of Marshall's opinion in Marbury. Significantly, it is not the theme that is
emphasized in most accounts of that case. What gets emphasized is Marshall's
broad defense of the power ofjudicial review or his claim that the laws must afford
remedies for violations of rights if the United States wishes to be viewed as a
government of laws and not of men.
Like James Madison, Marshall is best remembered for his statesman-like
appreciation of the practical difficulties that had to be addressed for the United
States to succeed as a decent and competent democracy. Again like Madison,
Marshall's principal achievements were in the field of practical governance and
involved reconciling appeals to individual liberties by a rights-oriented people with
the real demands of domestic and international politics. It was as an advocate of
for the preservation of a strong national system that led Marshall to publish a series of
newspaper essays in defense of his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. See 4 id. at 287-363.
'09 4 id. at 95. He returned to the issue of limits on judicial powers later in the same
speech:
The question whether vessels captured within three miles ofthe American coast,
or by privateers fitted out in the American ports, were legally captured or not,
and whether the American government was bound to restore them if in its
power, were questions of law, but they were questions of political law, proper
to be decided and they were decided by the executive and not by the courts.
4 id. at 103.
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modem natural rights thinking that he called for safeguarding the powers and hence
the effectiveness of the national and state governments. His forceful defense of
property rights in Fletcher v. Peck,"0 an 1810 Georgia case arising out of a
challenge to state action revoking a land deal on the grounds that it was marred by
improprieties on the part of some state legislators, remains one of the great
examples of natural rights reasoning in American law."' His Marbury opinion
contains as crisp a statement on legal protection for rights as appears anywhere in
constitutional law: "The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right.""' Marbury also stands-as the preeminent precedent for the principle that the
judiciary has a special responsibility to protect private rights. In one of the most-
cited passages in American case law, Marshall announced that "[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.""' By
extension, a constitutional system that invests judges with this high responsibility
must extend to them real independence inthe discharge of their duties." 4
If Marbury stands as the great precedent for the principle that independent
courts have a special obligation to redress violations of vested rights, it likewise
contains an important reminder of the limits of judicial review of governmental
action. Immediately following his observation that a government of laws must
afford protection for rights, Marshall argued that there are considerations that might
properly "exempt [a case] from legal investigation, or exclude the injured party
from legal redress.""' 5 By way of example, he turns to the political duties that fall
within the discretionary powers of the president: "By the constitution of the United
States, the president is invested with certain important political powers, in the
exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience.""' 6 This observation
anticipated the "political questions" doctrine that has played an important part in
recent malapportionment and separation of powers cases, witness Justice Felix
Frankfurter's declaration in Colegrove v. Green,"' an Illinois malapportionment
case, that the judiciary should beware of venturing into "political thicket[s]."' ..
110 U.S.87(1810).
Id. at 132-36, 139; see also Dartmouth College V. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819);
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
"I Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
113 Id. at 177.
"4 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
" Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.
116 Id. at 165.
17 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
11 Id. at 556. A decade and a half after Colegrove, it was Frankfurter's argument that the
Warren Court had to confront in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the major precedent
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Marshall's statesmanship runs through the totality of his jurisprudence. His
opinions are filled with evidence of his attentiveness to the political and cultural
implications of his reasoning. As already noted, he was a serious and self-conscious
participant in the whole founding project. He recognized, and embraced the
judiciary's power to give shape to the new national system that- the Constitution
called into being. For Marshall, this power brought with it the responsibility to
instruct the people not only in the value of rights but in the importance of preserving
competence in government. Here, indeed, were the two great themes of the Aaron
Burr treason case." 9 Grounding his opinion in a painstaking review of common law
principles and the language of the Constitution, Marshall refused to allow public
passions to trump principles of due process that afforded Burr protection against the
Jefferson Administration. Few passages in American case law rival Marshall's
summation in his Burr opinion of the high responsibilities that fall to members of
the judicial department:
That this court dares not usurp power is most true. That this court dares
not shrink from its duty is no less true. No man is desirous of placing
himself in a disagreeable situation. No man is desirous of becoming the
peculiar subject of calumny. No man might he let the bitter cup pass
from him without self-reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But if he
have no choice in the case, if there be no alternative presented to him but
a dereliction of duty or the opprobrium of those who are denominated
the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of his
country who can hesitate which to embrace.'20
This classic defense of political virtue captures Marshall's understanding of
statesman-like conduct and helps explain his fondness for George Washington.
Marshall's characterization of what is to be expected of courts of law, together with
the extensive protection he afforded Burr's rights in the face of extreme political
pressure, fits well with much of contemporary rights-oriented jurisprudence. What
must also be appreciated, however, is Marshall's acknowledgment that the interests
of the government "ought to be treated with respect"'' and that the privileges of the
Chief Executive enjoy constitutional protection alongside protection for personal
rights.'22 In response to the request for a subpoena duces tecum directed to
President Jefferson, which he finally consented to issue, Marshall carefully
reminded the parties that courts are not "to proceed against the president as against
for the modem political questions doctrine.
"' United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (1807).
120 Id. at 179.
21 Id. at 85.
122 See id.
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an ordinary individual."'2 While Marshall's careful treatment of governmental
interests is important in itself, a good case can be made for highlighting this side of
his legal thought which has recently been obscured by the appeal of his defense
both of judicial review and of the importance of protecting rights, whether of a
Marbury or a Burr.
There may be no better example of the sort of powers-sensitive reasoning that
lends sobriety to constitutional law than Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland.'24 If McCulloch represents for many contemporary scholars a
vindication of broad national powers that are most ideally used in the service of
advancing the protection of individual rights and equality, a careful reading of
Marshall's opinion reveals an intent on insuring that the powers of the central
government are equal to all its responsibilities, which include promoting a vigorous
economy as well as insuring order and stability. This, indeed, is the point of the
famous passage on the scope of the powers of the national government:
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are
limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the
sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.'25
This observation is followed by the equally important statement that the "degree of
the necessity"'26 of the means is to be determined by the political departments and
for the Court to inquire into such matters "would be to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground."'2 "
Marshall curtly added that "[this] Court disclaims all pretensions to such a
power."'28 Here is further evidence of his recognition that the judiciary's powers
are limited and must be understood in terms of the overall system of separated and
"' Id. at 192. This quote was used to good effect by Chief Justice Warren Burger in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (the Watergate Tapes case). For a recent
comment on the Marshall-Jefferson confrontation in the Burr case, see Akhil Reed Amar,
Nixon's Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1405, 1408 (1991).
124 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
1I id. at 421.
126 Id. at 423.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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divided powers and the requisites of effective government. Marshall envisions a
judiciary that is prepared to defer to legislative judgments about how best to use its
powers to meet Article II responsibilities. Presumably, these judgments would
involve efficiency calculations of the type that occasionally are found irksome by
rights-oriented jurists. 29
The events Marshall witnessed during the confederal period, both in the nation
at large and within Virginia, convinced him that natural rights are not well-protected
if government officials are left with insufficient power or are placed in a situation
that discourages reasonable use of delegated power.'3° His careful insertion of a
defense of the discretionary powers of thepresident in Marbury followed from his
understanding of the importance of preserving an effective executive and not from
any desire to conciliate Jefferson or to soften the effect of his endorsement of a
general power of judicial review.
Striking evidence of Marshall's acknowledgment that practical politics has a
protected place in the Constitution can be found in the great commerce case of
1824, Gibbons v. Ogden.' In his opinion for the Court, Marshall went so far as to
suggest that the appropriate use of the commerce power is typically to be
determined through political, and not judicial, processes.'32 In words that have
received too little attention, he reminded his contemporaries of how the affairs of
the people ought to bemanaged in a representative democracy:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with ,the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections,
are, in [the regulation of commerce], as in many other instances, as that,
for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from abuse. They are the restraints on which the
people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
33
This observation stands as both an important concession to governmental and
political interests and a significant limitation onjudicial review. The contrast with
the insistence of some scholars and judges that the judiciary has a moral
responsibility to do whatever it can do to advance aggrieved interests could hardly
129 See, e.g., Justice Brennan's objections to government reliance on efficiency
calculations in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 See 3 JOHN MARSHALL, LIFE OF WASHINGTON, .582-84, 588, 590-92 (1804).
131 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
112 See id. at 101.
'.. Id. at 197. The concerns raised by Marshall in McCulloch were resurrected in the
debate between Justices Stevens and Powell in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), a commerce clause case that produced a sharp division on
the question of judicial review of congressional employment of the commerce power.
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be more dramatic. 34
To appreciate the full grandeur of Marshall's jurisprudence it is necessary to
combine his approach to governmental powers with his commitment to protecting
rights. His writings remind us that political existence is not unidimensional, and
especially not simply defined by individual rights claims. Government must, of
necessity, be permitted to exercise legitimate powers and insist on the satisfaction
of the duties that march alongside rights. Instructive in this regard is a passage
found in his opinion in Providence Bank v. Billings: "However absolute the right
of an individual may be, it is still in the nature of that right, that it must bear a
portion of the public burdens, and that portion must be determined by the
Legislature."'35 He went on to add that "[legislative power] may be abused; but the
constitution of the United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every
abuse of power which may be committed by the state governments."'36 As in
Gibbons, Marshall noted that the principal check on "unwise" legislation is the
"wisdom and justice"'3 of legislators and their relationship to the people.
Marshall's articulation of the limits of rights-based appeals could almost seem
harsh on occasion. Witness in this connection not only his defense of Washington's
actions in suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion, but his conviction that persons in
the military might not claim the full benefits of the jury trial provision of the
Constitution.' His views on the latter issue reflect his understanding of the
complexities, what might well be termed the tragic side, of governance. Full
extension of the jury trial provision to cases involving members of the military,
according to Marshall, "would ... probably have prostrated the constitution itself,
with the liberties and the independence of the nation, before the first disciplined
invader who should approach our shores. Necessity would have imperiously
demanded the review and amendment of so unwise a provision."'39 His reference
to "necessity" is a reminder that practical political considerations have as important
a place in constitutional jurisprudence as appeals to protected individual rights.
IV. DISTILLING LESSONS FROM MARSHALL'S JURISPRUDENCE
John Marshall's attention to practical matters of governance within a framework
of natural rights was characteristic of the thinking of many leading Founders. It
surely was characteristic of James Madison's political labors. Whether one
'3' In this connection, consider the dissents of Justices Brennan and Blackmun in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep 't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
"1 29 U.S. (I Pet.) 514, 563 (1830).
136 Id.
137 Id.
'31 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
' ROBERT K. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 79 (1968).
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considers the famous "Memorial and Remonstrance" on religious liberty in 1785140
or the pivotal role he played -in shaping the Bill of Rights in 1789,41 Madison
understood that to be considered legitimate, according to modem natural rights
theory, a republic must respect the rights of the people. He accepted Jefferson's
argument that specific guarantees for fundamental rights should be a part of the
constituting charter of the republic. The fact that heurged inclusion of a provision
that would have restrained state interference with fundamental rights is evidence
that he took the protection of rights seriously.'42 He also understood, however, that
it is possible to push a good thing too far. 43 Witness his fears that the addition of
rights-oriented amendments to the Constitution could sap the national government
of its powers and effectiveness.'" These fears explain in large part his decision to
take a leading role in shaping the content of any new amendments to the
Constitution. 4 It is instructive to recall that he lobbied to integrate the new
amendments into the body of the Constitution, thereby diminishing the likelihood
that they would take on a life of their own. When introducing his amendments to
Congress, Madison pointedly warned his colleagues that any additions must be "of
such a nature as will not injure the constitution."'46  What he feared were
amendments that could damage the capacity of the new national government to
oversee the great affairs of a commercial nation.
It was as a friend of rights-oriented government that Madison labored to
preserve effectiveness in government. It is revealing of his thinking that when he
summarized in Federalist No. 51 the task faced by the Constitutional Convention,
he argued that the first problem was to ensure that the new political system would
be capable of controlling the people: "In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself."' 47 The principal lesson of the period between 1776 and 1789 for
Madison was that weak and inconsistent government is bad for rights and, hence,
bad for democracy. Here is the explanation, as well, for his approving observation
in the waning days of the Constitutional Convention that the delegates had decided
140 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298-304 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
'4' See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 289-303 (1990).
142 See id at 303.
14' Evidence that Publius believed it was possible to have an undue concern for rights
appears in. THE FEDERALIST, No. 63.
'44 See KETCHAM, supra note 14 1, at 262, 274, 303.
14s See id. at 274-75.
'4 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 140, at 198. For additional related
observations by Madison, see I THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 432, 746 (1834).
"' THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 354 (Edward G. Bourne ed. 1937).
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to limit the court to reviewing "cases of a Judiciary nature."'' 4 It would be wrong,
however, to treat his support of this vote as evidence of opposition to judicial
review.. What it highlights is his belief that we should not overlook the practical
demands of effective governance, among which is the need to allow the political
departments to do their work free of excessive judicial intrusion, even in the name
of protecting rights. As with Marshall, Madison understood that a healthy balance
had to be maintained between concern for rights and attention to the requirements
of competence and vigor in government. Again like Marshall, Madison recognized
that it is dangerous to undermine the respect of a rights-oriented people for
government because of their natural inclination to endorse curbs on the exercise of
political power.
Madison's attention to the practical side of governance is visible in his quarrel
with Jefferson's insistence that no generation should be permitted to shift its debts
to succeeding generations, thereby limiting their descendants' freedom to control
their own destiny. For Madison, such reasoning abstracts from the realities of
political life in a way that could leave government helpless in the face of political
necessities that might require extraordinary action. Though he understood that
deficit spending constrains the freedom of future generations to control their own
affairs as they please, such constraints represent part of the cost of equipping the
government to protect national interests. Leaving an opening for one generation to
bind another represented for Madison a concession to political necessity that is not
incompatible with republican principles of government. Embedded in this argument
is another important lesson that a nation overlooks at its peril: that society is
something greater than the individual members who compose it at any single
historical moment.
For both Marshall and Madison, constitutional republicanism should look to
achieve reasonable goals by making reasonable demands of the citizen body.
Neither Marshall nor Madison associated republican constitutionalism with utopian
ends or extraordinary human sacrifice. This is not to suggest that they believed it
would be easy either to construct or to maintain a nation state based on republican
principles of individual rights, due process of law, and limited government They
did believe that achieving a reasonable balance between protection for rights and
effectiveness in government was within the grasp of the American people. As the
enjoyment of rights could not come at the expense of having a government capable
of controlling the people, so effectiveness in government could not come at the
expense of due process of law.
Marshall and Madison gave what might be called a moderate or sober reading
to the ends of the modem liberal state and viewed decent and competent democratic
government as something that should never be taken for granted. They took
... 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed.
1966).
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seriously the teaching that can be traced to Plato and Thucydides that civilized
orders are constantly threatened by the forces of barbarism, in the form of either
anarchy or tyranny. What is notable about their respective contributions to the
founding of the American republic is the ease with which they can be associated
with the defense of liberty as well as with arguments for effectiveness in
government. They spoke seriously and openly about the high value of individual
rights and the importance of entrustinggovernment with sufficient power to control
the people. Reflection on their handling of powers and rights lends sobriety and,
hence, moderation to constitutional reasoning, the moderation that Marshall
believed to be critical to a decent and competent democratic republic. This sobriety
is endangered by excessive attention to rights, especially when coupled with the
contemporary impulse to take the resiliency and sufficiency of governmental
powers for granted-a problem that has been exacerbated with the end of the Cold
War. Scholars and practitioners who are doing battle over the proper content and
structure of constitutional discourse would do well to revisit the legal and political
thought of John Marshall.
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